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Abstract: To create sustainable, adaptive and resilient societies we need to develop a
proper understanding of infrastructure risk. This research improves such
understanding by examining widespread failures of interdependent infrastructure
networks from extreme climate events. By subjecting infrastructure networks to
extreme climate loading, we construct ensembles of direct failure sets that lead to
cascading indirect failures across topological infrastructure networks. Such analysis
produces two results: (1) Estimations of the topological fragility of infrastructure
networks, and (2) Infrastructure vulnerability quantification in terms of spatial affects
on service provision and customers using networked infrastructures. Producing
multiple failure sets provides a wide range of possible outcomes, helping to build
infrastructure failure profiles. Insights from risk analysis strengthen our
understanding of infrastructure failures and are used to inform resilience-building
activities for effective infrastructure provision.
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I. Introduction
Infrastructure sustainability, adaptation or resilience is better understood by examining
national infrastructure risk. In the context of this research, national infrastructures represent civil
and technological structures that provide goods and services to industries, governments and
households operating at regional and national scales. In particular infrastructures such as
electricity, gas, rail, road, and ICT are among critical national infrastructures, constituting the
backbone of society and economy1,2. For better performance and service provision national
infrastructures are highly interdependent systems through physical, technological or economic
mechanisms3.Though interdependencies are desirable for maintaining infrastructure functionality
and service delivery, they become disadvantageous during widespread failures, which result in
failure cascading effects that propagate damages from one infrastructure to another4.
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Extreme climate events put national infrastructures at risk because they are capable of causing
widespread social and economic losses. Notably extreme hurricanes in the United States, floods
in United Kingdom, and extreme heat in Australia have highlighted the large-scale
vulnerabilities of national infrastructures provisions5,6,7. National scale climate change risk
assessment policy statements have emphasized the imminent risks to critical national
infrastructures in the present and future8,9. Climate risk modeling is inherently complex due to
systematic uncertainties that propagate from extreme climate hazards towards infrastructure
responses and failure impacts10. For critical national infrastructures a system-of-systems (SoS)
approach is required for modeling escalating failures that affect multiple systems and multiple
participants11. In this paper we present a SoS framework where infrastructures represent systems
of interdependent spatial networks that are exposed to probabilistic extreme hazard scenarios.
Infrastructures are spatially distributed systems spread over large geographic areas. Further
there are several components or assets within each infrastructure and across infrastructures that
are connected physically or through flow of information. As such an overall spatial network
topology can be identified to build a unified representation of infrastructures12. Extreme climate
loading conditions initiate random failures of network assets and the topology determines the
further propagation of these failures across entire networks13. Following network damages the
SoS risks are quantified in terms of the consequences in terms of spatial damage impacts,
demographic disruption impacts and interdependent economic loss impacts14.
The climate risk analysis methodology proposed in this paper aims to compute the overall risk
of failure of infrastructure networks when exposed to multiple probabilistic climate hazards. By
subjecting infrastructure networks to extreme climate loading, we construct ensembles of direct
asset failure sets that lead to cascading indirect failures across topological infrastructure
networks. Such analysis produces two results: (i) Estimations of the topological fragility of
infrastructure networks, and (ii) Infrastructure vulnerability quantification in terms of spatial
affects on service provision and customers using networked infrastructures. Producing multiple
failure sets provides a wide range of possible outcomes, helping to build infrastructure failure
profiles. Insights from risk analysis strengthen our understanding of infrastructure failures and
are used to inform resilience-building activities for effective infrastructure provisions.
In the sections that follow we first explain the formulation for calculating interdependent
infrastructure risk for extreme climate hazards. Next we present the underlying SoS framework
that needs to be constructed for implementing the different components of the risk calculations.
This is followed by a sample case-study demonstration for a national-scale network and hazard.
II. Quantifying infrastructure risk
Infrastructure risk is broadly quantified as the product of the probabilities and consequences
of network failures conditional upon probabilistic extreme climate hazards 10. Within the context
of this paper, reliability is the measure of the probability of failure, which is studied at the
individual assets level and then at the infrastructure network level. For damage assessment the
focus lies in estimating the customer losses and infrastructure output degradations, which
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ultimately are converted to economic losses aatt appropriate individual asset, network or nationalnational
scale levels.
Probabilistic extreme climate loading is quantified in terms of its spatial magnitude vector
and joint probability distribution
. To calculate risk we first represent an individual
infrastructure asset functionality through a state function , such that
denotes a ‘failed’
state and
denotes a ‘non-failed’
failed’ state. Also we define two variables: (i)
: The
conditional probability of failure of an ass
asset (fragility)) when subjected to the external hazard
loading , (ii)
: The damage associated with the failure of the asset. For the entire
infrastructure network, consisting of
assets, functionality depends on all the asset
states collected
ollected into a binary vector
, whose elements are either 0 or 1
describing which assets have failed and which have not failed. In particular network reliability,
damages and risk depend upon the elements in .
ard there are many possible failure combinations of assets that result
When exposed to the hazard
in network failure. In the most exhaustive scenario there are possible
failure state
combinations, but in reality fewer combinations can capture most of the failures. The vector
defined before represents just one of the possible failure states and is defined here as a failure
mechanism.. We define the vector
to represent the
failure mechanism and
the tensor
as the collection of failure combinations that contribute to
overall network failure. The infrastructure network risk (
) formulation proposed in this
paper is based on: (i) estimating the combined asset failure probabilities (
) and damages
(
) duee to multiple failure mechanisms, and (ii) repeating the calculations over multiple
hazard loadings . This is shown in Equation (1) below and summarized in Figure 1.

(1)

Figure 1. Framework for risk calculations required in the network failure analysis.
analysis
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III. Risk implementation
Figure 2 shows a detailed flowchart for constructing component models and implementing a
national infrastructure risk calculation framework that solves Equation (1). The important
components in the flowchart are explained as follows:
1.

Hazard estimation (Component A): Different types of extreme climate models can be built
to estimate hazard severity (
) and uncertainty (
). Some of the models (Hazard extent
maps/Spatial distributions of hazards/Spatial-temporal distributions of hazards) that are used
in this framework are shown in the component A.

2.

Network estimation (Component B): Topological network representations are essential for

generating failures and computing failure probabilities ( |). In this framework
networks are built from information on the geo-locations of assets and their physical
connectivity to other assets and networks.

3.

Network reliability analysis (Component C): Reliability analysis provides the framework
for building failure mechanisms, which leads to the computation of asset and topological
fragilities, and ultimately the network failure probability. In this framework direct failures
simulated by Monte-Carlo based approaches and network connectivity are utilised to
estimate resulting topological failures.

4.

Infrastructure damage assessment (Component D): Damages are quantified spatially by
first constructing infrastructure footprints that estimate the number of customers served over
the area influence of assets. Following this the direct and indirect spatial and demographic
impact effects for asset damages and network losses can be quantified by assembling the
footprints of all failed assets. For economic analysis purposes, the total network damage
effects constitute direct economic losses due to infrastructure asset failures.

5.

Economic damage (loss) assessment (Component E): The supply and demand side loss
inputs are fed into an economic input-output model. Using the economic input-output
analysis to find the disrupted equilibrium state we can generate the indirect losses and total

losses (  ) due to the network failures.

6.

Risk calculation (Component F): Network risk  is computed when the reliability and
damage estimations are implemented over multiple failure mechanisms and multiple hazards.
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Figure 2: Flowchart showing steps in the ITRC WS2 Phase 2 infrastructure risk analysis.

IV. Case-study demonstration
Obtaining high quality data for the different components of the risk framework is very
challenging, so models are employed wherever necessary. The case-study results shown here are
synthetic but serve the important purpose of providing a template for risk calculations when real
data is available. The risk methodology outlined in the sections above is implemented for
simulated probabilistic hazard events that affect a sample topological electricity network for
Great Britain. The network is a satisfactory topological representation of the actual electricity
transmission network for Great Britain15. Further, the network nodes represent electricity
substations that served customers over regions estimated from population census data16.
Figure 3(a) introduces the test network with nodes (substation) fragilities, magnified according
to their relative values, after being intersected with a sample probabilistic spatial hazard event.
This result is obtained by implementing the components A, B and C from the framework Figure
2. Using Figure 3(a) we can identify the substations that are at most risk of failing. Based on the
node fragilities and resulting network behaviors we can generate a sample of different possible
failure mechanisms. This is shown in Figure 3(b) where the resulting damages in terms of
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customers affected are calculated for each direct and indirect failure mechanism. Hence, we are
also able to obtain a range of possible risk outcomes from the analysis.

(a)

(b)

Figure 3. Figures showing (a) The network node fragilities (color coded and weighted by
magnitude) for a particular hazard event, (b) Sample failure mechanisms and direct and indirect
customers affected.

Another outcome of the analysis is shown in Figure 4 where the ranges of risks (in £ millions)
are calculated for multiple mechanisms across different hazard events (given by their exceedance
probabilities). This result is obtained by executing the components D and F in the Figure 2
framework. Figure 4 captures the uncertainty of the risk analysis across a range of different
infrastructure provisions.

Figure 4. Plot of risks in £ million vs. hazard exceedance probabilities. The solid line shows the
mean risk and the shaded boundaries show the maximum and minimum risk outcomes.
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